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Abstract. Mcthods of elitc idcntificatioo mcasurc different aspccts of power in socictics. Thc 
relationship bctween the positional and thc decisional methods was studied empirically, usingdata 
from a 1981 West German elite survey. In this survey, respondents determined through the 
positional method were askcd to name their interaction partners for (political) issucs in which they 
were activcly involved. Thc results show that incumbcncy of an elite position is a crucial precondi-
tion for becoming politically influential. Only a small numbcr of legislators, joumalists, and 
academics who did not hold an elite position were mcntiooed as key influentials. The same data 
were also used to determine the denser part of the West German elite network which was made up 
of 559 core decision-makers. The sector composition of this elite circle underlines the intennedi-
ating role of political leaders and senior civil servants. 
1. Introduction 
Every empirical study of power and elites faces two important problems. Tue 
first is how power can be measured in a social system. The second is whether it 
is justified to assume the existence of a central oore elite, a power elite, in 
complex industrial societies. Empirical studies of elites have used different 
methods to operationalize the power of individuals. Three principal methods 
to identify the powerful in a social system are customarily distinguished: the 
reputational, the decisional, and the positional method. Tue controversy over 
the validity of these methods has for the most part been oonsidered a method-
ological question. In fact, however, it is of considerable theoretical relevance. 
Each of these methods measures different aspects of power. Thus, none of 
them can be oonsidered as methodologically superior. The choice of the 
appropriate method depends instead on the research question at band. In the 
following, a theoretical framework will be presented that shows how these 
three methods are interrelated. In a next step, the empirical relationship 
between two of these methods will be analyzed, namely between the positional 
and the decisional method. 
In recent years, network analyses of elite.interactions have been increasing-
ly used to study elite structures. Most of these studies have analyzed in-
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terlocking directorates and local elites. The few studies of national elites have 
for the most part been limited to sectoral elites or to the decision-making in 
specific national issue areas (e.g. Laumann et al. 1985). So far, only two 
network studies have been published that attempted to answer the second 
question stated above, narnely whether there exists an overarching network of 
national elites linking decision-makers of different issue areas. These were 
studies of U.S. and Australian national elites (Moore 1979, Higley etal. 1979, 
Higley and Moore 1981), both of which found a central circle of core elites, 
thus answering the qtiestion affirmatively. 
In 1981, the same method was applied to study the West German national 
elite network. Tue West German study goes beyond its predecessors in two 
respects: 
- its elite sample was much larger; 
- the study included respondents from a rnore broadly defined elite universe. 
lt provides therefore an ideal data base to study the two questions raised 
above. 
2. Dimensions ot power 
2.1. Power and influence on strategic decisions 
Any empirical study of power and influence requires a theoretical as weil as an 
operational definition of these two related but distinct concepts. In a rather 
general way, both concepts can be defined interchangeably as the ability to 
influence the outcomes of collective decisions in a social system (cf. Nagel 
1976). However, the two concepts take on different meanings if we also take 
into account the resources on which this influence is based. There is wide-
spread agreernent that it is the availability of sanctions that distinguishes the 
two (cf. Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 76, Parsons 1969a: 361, Parsons 1969b: 
421). Influence can therefore be redefined as the ability to achieve desired 
results without resorting to sanctions. 
Once power and influence are conceptualized this way, it is possible to 
resort to well-established methods of investigating power structures empirical· 
ly by studying elites. The definition of elites as persons with influence on 
important political decisions is widely shared in the academic community. To 
make it even more appropriate for studying the more durable aspects of power 
structures, it is often further assumed that this influence is exerted on a regular 
basis and not limited to single decisions (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 201, 
Scheuch 1973: 1028, Putnam 1976: 6, Higley et al. 1979: 3). 
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2.2. Methods of elite identification 
The following brief discussion of the three methods of elite identification will 
focus on the major differences between them regarding the implicit concept of 
power each of them tries to measure. 
The reputational method relies on experts who are asked to identify the 
powerful in a social system. The method's validity rests therefore entirely on 
the perceptions of the experts chosen - perceptions which are necessarily 
subjective. Moreover, the experts' knowledge about the power structure is 
always Iimited to a small range of important decision-making arenas. The 
method therefore produces the best results if used to identify powerful persons 
in a limited setting that is directly observable to the experts. This is generally 
the case if elites are chosen as "experts", which has become increasingly 
common in recent years (e.g. Pappi 1984, Moore 1979, Higley et al. 1979). 
The decisional method measures political influence directly as active partici-
pation in political decision-making. This method has the advantage of using a 
behaviourally derived measure of influence and suffers less from the draw-
backs of subjectivity. On the other band, the necessarily small range of issues 
that can be studied empirically to determine participants in political decision-
making makes it problematic to generalize the findings to the entire power 
structure. Moreover, this method ignores non-decisions as well as indirect 
forms of political influence. Pappi and Melbeck have therefore concluded that 
it runs the risk of disregarding the structural, durable side of power (1984: 
580). 
The positional method, finally, starts out from the assumption that power in 
complex societies rests on resources associated with fonnal positions of au-
thority in political institutions as weil as private organizations. lt considers 
therefore the holders of key positions in such organizations as belonging to the 
elite. For theoretical as well as pragmatic reasons, the positional method has 
become the one commonly used to study national elites. lt provides an expe-
dient way to identify a sample of position-holders in important organizations 
through recourse to readily available handbook type of information. More-
over, there is general agreement that in modern societies this method will miss 
only a very small number of powerful persons, since power as a rule depends 
on the control over organizational power resources. So long as the universe of 
elite positions is defined broadly and not restricted to political elites in a 
narrow sense, this approach yields an inclusive sample of persons who can be 
assumed to play important roles in a society. 
2.3. A classification of the three methods of elite identification 
Fig. 1 shows that the three methods of elite identification differ with respect to 
two basic dimensions of power: 
- The extent to which they take into account only formal power resources 
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Reputational Method 
Fig. J. Classification of the methods of elite identification. 
associated with leadership positions in important organizations or rather 
use a broader concept of power and influence that allows for other (in-
formal) influence resources as weil. 
The extent to which their focus is limited to participation in political 
decision-making or also takes into account indirect influence on important 
political decisions. The latter includes, for instance, the mobilization of 
public opinion on behalf of a political issue, or decisions in the private 
sector with political ramifications, such as wage settlements, investment 
decisions, etc. 
lt is obvious that the codified rules of political decision-making - on which 
legal studies of power almost exclusively rely - imply the most restrictive 
concept of power. The decisional as weil as the positional method each extend 
this concept on one of the two dimensions, but not on the other. The reputa-
tional method, finally, measures power and influence in the broadest sense. 
Once we conceptualize the three methods this way, it makes sense to study 
how they are interrelated. The following analysis will show to what extent 
organizational power resources - measured by the positional method - are 
transformed into political influence - measured as participation in political 
decision-making by the decisional method. 
Incumbents of leadership positions in large organizations control power 
resources that are relevant both for decision-making within the organization 
and for inter-organizational bargaining. While we can assume that intra-
organizational decision-making is normally resolved by authoritative decisions 
of the formal leaders of an organization (Pappi 1984: 79), no such hierarchical 
relationship exists among autonomous organizations participating in inter-
organizational decisions. This is particularly true for political decisions. Even 
though the final authority to decide political matters rests within political 
decision-making bodies, these are not hierarchically superior to other power-
ful public and private organizations that also try to influence those decisions. 
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Political decisions are therefore typically compromises rather than the product 
of authoritative fiat. Informal relations play an important role in political 
decision-making, and strategic location in a network of communication may 
itself become a resource giving influence to individuals who do not otherwise 
control many power resources. At the same time, different power resources 
may neutralize each other. 
Measuring political influence empirically as participation in political deci-
sion-making has the additional advantage of solving a major problem of the 
positional method, namely the specification of boundaries for a positionally 
defined elite population, i.e. to determine the overall size of an elite pop-
ulation. The method itself does not provide criteria for specifying such bound-
aries for an elite. This is due to the lack of an a priori criterion that would allow 
the researcher to compare the power resources of different positions, orga-
nizations, and sectors. Tue multidimensional nature of power resources in a 
modern society precludes the availability of a simple, quantitative, and uni-
dimensional yardstick. Power resources can be directly compared only within 
organizations that have formal hierarchies of power, even though systematic 
deviations from the formal structure do frequently occur even in that setting. 
In some sectors it is also possible to determine the relative power of different 
organizations according to a single, quantitative criterion, e.g. by comparing 
the turnover of business companies, the circulation of print media, or the 
number of members of trade unions. However, it is not possible to compare 
the power of different types of organizations, subsectors, or sectors in a 
general way - e.g. the power of the press to the power of television, or the 
power of the national political executive to the power of the mass media. 
Tue other two methods of elite identification alleviate this problem by 
specifying a uniform criterion for elite membership. The reputational method 
leaves the decision to the experts: elite membership is determined by the 
number of nominations an individual has received as being powerful. Tue 
decisional method in turn uses involvement in political decision-making. To 
solve the boundary specification problem, it is therefore necessary to supple-
ment the positional method by one of the other two methods. 
3. Sociometric nominations of positional elites In West Germany 
In the following, the formal decision-making authority associated with a 
leadership position will be considered as an indicator of power. Political 
influence will be measured as the attempt to realize preferences by active 
participation in political decision-making. Since participants in political deci-
sion-making, i.e. political influentials, may or may not have the resources of a 
leadership position at their disposal, the results should provide important 
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insights into the relevance of different power resources for political influence. 
Conversely, it is of considerable interest to learn to what extent positionally 
defined elites actually use their power resources to influence strategic deci-
sions. This can be determined either by decision-making studies or by asking 
position-holders about their activities. Being nominated as influential by other 
elite members is another crucial indicator of political influence. In the follow-
ing, the latter measure will be used to study the relationship between posi-
. tional power and political influence. 
3.1. The data base: the We.rt German elite .rtudy 1981 
The sociometric nominations analyzed here are taken from a national elite 
survey carried out in 1981 in the Federal Republic of Germany.1 The study 
started out by delineating a universe of 3,580 elite positions. All major sectors 
and organizations were represented according to their presumed relevance. In 
a next step, the names of the holders of these positions were detennined. Due 
to multiple position-holding this number was smaller and encqmpassed only 
3,164 persons (cf. Hoffmann-Lange 1985: 74ff.). 1,744 of these position-
holders could actually be interviewed. Tue response rate of 55.lo/o can be 
considered satisfactory for an elite study, especially since it was unbiased. Tue 
refusal rate among senicir position-holders was not significantly higher than 
among Jower-level position-holders in the sample. Nor was the numerical 
representation of the various sectors in the sample (sector composition) signif· 
icantly affected (cf. Hoffmann-Lange 1987: 36-39). 
A major objective of this elite survey was to study interaction patterns 
within the West German elite. This was achieved by asking the respondents for 
sociometric nominations which resulted in a sociometrically-delineated elite 
roster. The questions were made as closely comparable as possible to those 
used in the two previous network studies of national elites. Respondents were 
first asked to indicate the issue on which they had been most active during the 
last year. After having described the nature of this issue in some detail, they 
were further asked to name their most important interaction partners in the 
context of this issue. 
This question can be regarded as measuring political influence. Since its 
focus was on issues of more than intra-organizational relevance, most respon-
dents named political issues. The question formal elicited nominations of 
interaction partners who can be assumed to have tried to influence the respon-
dents or whom the respondent himself had tried to influence. Since the 
respondents were not restricted to naming only persons from a predefined Jist, 
interaction partners who did not belong to the positional elite sample could be 
nominated. However, since the respondents were asked to name only their 
most important interaction partners, the number of nominated persons was 
presumably much smaller than the actual number of interaction partners. 2 Tue 
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approach can therefore be considered as a hybrid form of the decisional and 
the reputational method. 
The idiosyncratic choice of the issue for which nominations were made 
cannot be regarded as a disadvantage even though it makes it impossible to 
trace interaction networks for single issues. lt can even be considered as a 
distinct advantage of this method that the issues named by the respondents 
covered the entire range of relevant decision-making matters in which the 
elites were involved during the interview period. Thus, what was lost in 
issue-specific content, was gained in generality, i.e. inclusiveness of the issue 
universe. 
3.2. The distribution of nominations for sample members and other persons 
Altogether, the respondents made 11,457 nominations, an average of 6.6 
interactions partners per respondent. Among the 4, 762 nominated interaction 
partners, only 1,358 (28.5%) were sample members and 3,404 were other 
person. This shows that the universe of political influentials differs consid-
erably from the positionally defined elite sample. 70% of the nominated 
persons, however, can be regarded as specialists since they received only one 
nomination. If we take the number of received nominations into account, it 
becomes apparent that among the influentials who received more than one 
nomination, sample members play a more important role (59.8% ). Moreover, 
an even )arger share of the nominations went to members of the so-called "top 
Tab/e /. Distribution of nominations. 
Distribution of oominations for all pcrsons registered 
Total Total Persons lnteraction 
numberof pcrsons without panncrs 
nominations registered nominations nominated 
n %' n %' D %' %' D %' %' !!{'! 
Membersof 
topsample 5194 45.3 904 13.8 312 34.5 17.3 592 65.5 12.4 5.7 
Other sample 
members 1915 16.7 2260 34.4 1494 66.I 82.7 766 33.9 16.1 0.8 
Totalsample 7109 62.0 3164 48.2 1806 57.l 100.0 1358 42.9 28.5 2.2 
Other 
persons 4348 38.0 3404 51.8 3404 100.0 71.5 1.3 
Total 11457 100.0 6568 100.0 1806 27.5 100.0 4762 72.5 100.0 1.7 
1 Column percentages based on column totals; i Row pcrcentages based on row totals; 'Average 
number of oominations received. 
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sample". This includes only the holders of the most senior positions in each 
sector such as ministers, presidents of big pressure groups, chairmen of the 
boards of business corporations, chief editors of newspapers, etc. This group 
of 904 people encompasses 28.6% of the entire elite sample and 12.4% of all 
interaction partners, but received nearly one half of all nominations (45.3%). 
The results Support therefore the assumption of a high concentration of 
political influence among the top position-holders in the Federal Republic. 
3.3. The involvement of different organizations in political decision-making 
The number of nominations a person has received can be used as a rather 
straightforward indicator of involvement in political decision-making. Given 
the fact that only 42.9% of all sample members were named as intluentials, it 
seems interesting to analyze group differences among the sample members. 
This allows the determination of organizations whose representatives are 
more or less involved in political decision-making. Table 1 shows that nearly 
half of all nominations were given to members of the top sample as compared 
to only 16. 7% for other positional elites. Similarly, in all sectors the proportion 
of the top sample members with nominations is much higher (Table 2). This 
effect is less pronounced among politicians and leaders of business corpora-
Table 2. Sample members with nominations by sector. 
Seetor Total Samplc mcmbers Top Top sample membcrs 
sample with nominarions sample with nominations 
n n % n n % 
Politics1 452 369 81.6 246 237 96.3 
Civil service2 471 255 54.1 82 55 67.l 
Business 688 223 32.4 242 114 47.l 
Business associations 295 99 33.6 61 38 62.3 
Trade unions 155 82 52.9 33 29 87.9 
Mass media 354 116 32.8 88 50 56.8 
Academic 179 81 45.3 46 30 65.2 
Military 172 16 9.3 27 8 29.6 
Cultural elites 180 35 19.4 43 12 27.9 
Other' 218 82 37.6 36 19 52.8 
Total 3.164 1.358 42.9 904 592 65.S 
1 lncluding fivc West German chairmen of committees of the European Parliamenl; 2 lncluding 
twelve West German rcpresentativcs in top positions of the administration of thc Europcan 
Community; 3 Representatives of churches, local govemments. judiciary. professional associa-
tions, consumers' associations, and pcrsons who lost their eli!e position shortly bcfore or during 
the field work of the study. 
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tions, but particularly striking in the pressure groups, mass media, and the 
academic sector. 3 
The difference between the two positional subsamples is also apparent in the 
average number of received nominations (Table 3). The concentration of 
nominations on members of the top sample supports the assumption that the 
nominations can be considered as a measure of reputation for political influen-
ce rather than simply indicating involvement in political decision-making. This 
becomes particularly clear when we look at the political sector. Even though 
all members of the political elite are by definition active in political decision-
making, the holders of political top positions attracted the lion's share of the 
nominations that were given to politicians. Another reason for the concentra-
tion of nominations on top position-holders is that the great majority (77. 7%) 
of the nominations is intersectoral rather than intrasectoral, as can be seen in 
Table 4. lt seems plausible that contacts to other organizations should be 
directed primarily to the formal leaders of those organizations. This is due to 
the greater visibility of these leaders in public as weil as to their presumed 
greater power. They are therefore the major recipients of influence attempts 
by leaders of other organizations. Table 4 reveals that politics is the most 
important sector, receiving 41.5% of all nominations. The figures in Table 4 
deviate, however, from those in Table 3 in that they are not based on people, 
but on nominations. The data indicate that we have to distinguish between the 
importance of a sector as a target of influence attempts and the importance of 
the individuals in a sector, as measured by the average number of nominations. 
Table 3. Average number of nominations by sector. 
Seetor Top Other sample Total Other Total' 
samplc' members1 sample1 persons 
(n= 904) (n= 2260) (n= 3164) (n= 3404) (n = 4762) 
Politics 13.8 2.2 8.5 1.7 5.3 
Civil service 4.8 1.3 1.9 1.2 2.0 
Business 1.8 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.8 
Business associations 3.9 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.8 
Trade unions 9.5 1.4 3.1 1.3 3.1 
Mass media 2.2 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.6 
Acadcmic 2.9 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.6 
Military 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.3 1.5 
Cultural elitcs 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.2 
Other 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 
Total 5.7 0.8 2.2 1.3 2.4 
1 Mcans for sample based on all sample members; 2 Based on persons with nominations only. 
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Table 4. lntersectoral and Intrasectoral Links. (percentages based on row totals). 
Nominating sector Nominations receivcd Total 
nomina-
Politics Civil Business Business Trade Mass Acadcmic Military Cultural Other tions 
scrvice associa- unions media elites given 
tions 
Politics n 939 163 100 96 131 134 84 5 8 189 1849 
% 50.8 8.8 5.4 5.2 7.1 7.2 4.5 0.3 0.4 10.2 16.1 
Civil n 597 417 64 86 76 83 104 4 2 156 1589 
servicc % 37.6 26.2 4.0 5.4 4.8 5.2 6.5 0.3 0.1 9.8 13.9 
Business n 614 238 360 123 151 103 82 4 s 92 1772 
% 34.7 13.4 20.3 6.9 8.5 5.8 4.6 0.2 0.3 5.2 15.5 
Business n 463 177 136 156 62 75 86 1 2 74 1232 
associations % 37.6 14.4 11.0 12.7 5.0 6.1 7.0 0.1 0.2 6.0 10.8 
Trade unions n 384 94 103 57 72 52 26 0 1 45 834 
% 46.0 11.3 12.4 6.8 8.6 6.2 3.1 0.0 0.1 5.4 7.3 
Massmedia n 721 89 99 39 64 178 72 3 18 133 1416 
% 50.9 6.3 7.0 2.8 4.5 12.6 5.1 0.2 1.3 9.4 12.4 
Acadcmic n 327 178 107 44 27 48 176 1 4 58 970 
% 33.7 18.4 11.0 4.5 2.8 4.9 18.1 0.1 0.4 6.0 8.5 
Military n 92 19 10 9 2 
% 42.0 8.7 4.6 4.1 0.9 
Cultural n 119 26 21 4 16 
elites % 22.9 5.0 4.0 0.8 3.1 
Other n 504 113 S9 28 48 
% 47.7 10.7 5.6 2.6 4.5 
Total 
nominations n 4760 1514 1059 642 649 
received % 41.5 13.2 9.2 S.2 5.7 
Popularity 
ratio1 2.58 0.95 0.59 0.52 0.78 
1 po ularit ratio~ percentagc of nomination~ rece~ved (% column total) 
p y percentage of nommat1ons g1ven (% row total) 
25 10 20 
11.4 4.6 9.1 
99 49 1 
19.1 9.4 0.2 
79 74 4 
7.5 7.0 0.4 
876 763 43 
7.6 6.7 0.4 
0.61 0.79 0.2l 
1 31 
0.5 14.2 
98 86 
18.!I 16.6 
6 142 
0.6 13.4 
145 1006 
1.3 8.8 
0.29 1.96 
219 
1.9 
519 
4.5 
1057 
9.2 
11457 
100.0 
0--.... 
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This can be done by comparing the values in the last row ofTable 4 to those in 
the last column of Table 3. The civil service for instance received the second 
largest number of nominations (13.2%) even though the average number of 
nominations per person in this sector is only 2.0. The 1,514 nominations forthis 
sector went to 773 different people. In the highly centralized trade unions, the 
649 nominations were instead concentrated on only 209 individuals. The 
dispersion of the nominations for a sector depends thus on the degree of 
internal differentiation of that sector. 
The military and cultural sectors rank Jowest on both dimensions while 
politics ranks highest. The importance of the political sector is not surprising 
considering that final decision-making authority for most of the issues men-
tioned by the respondents rests with the political institutions. The political 
sector is therefore central in a threefold sense: 
- lt received the highest share of nominations (Table 4); 
- Most of the holders of political leadership positions were named as being 
politically influential at least once (Table 2); 
- Political leaders received the highest average number of nominations per 
person (Table 3). 
3 .4. Political influentials outside the positionally defined elite universe 
While the foregoing analysis showed to what extent power resources connect-
ed with formal leadership positions are transformed into political influence, it 
is also of interest to look at those individuals who received nominations 
without occupying such leadership positions. As was said before, the great 
rnajority of these people were nominated only once and can be regarded as 
specialists. 573 of them, however, received two or more nominations and are 
of more general relevance as political influentials. 
Two reasons may account for the fact that these persons were not members 
of the positionally defined elite sample: shortcomings of the sampling design 
or systematic divergences between positional power and political influence. 
Shortcomings of the sampling design may in turn take three different forms: 
omission of important sectors, organizations, or positions. The analysis of the 
positions and organizational affiliations of these 573 influentials can reveal 
which of these reasons played a role in our study. 
Tue first step was to look at those who did not belong to any major sector of 
the positional sample and bad been assigned to the "Other" category. This was 
the case for only 45 of 573. 15 of these 45 belonged to minor sectors already 
included in the sample, namely churches, the judiciary, and professional 
associations. Another 14 represented small voluntary associations, seven were 
ordinary citizens (e.g. fawyers, doctors), and nine were foreigners. This con-
firms that no important sector bad been overlooked by the original sampling 
procedure. 
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528 of the 573 influentials outside the sample held positions in one of the 
sectors already included in the sample. 30 were former holders of elite posi-
tions. Another 31 represented organizations not included in the sample be-
cause they were too small to match the selection criteria. The others were 
holders of less senior positions in organizations already represented in the 
sample. Among them, four categories are worth mentioning: 139 members of 
the Bundestag or state parliaments; 51 higher civil servants in federal and state 
ministries; 75 joumalists, some of them nationally prominent reporters and 
commentators; and finally, 74 university professors. 
These results illustrate clearly that political influence in the Federal Repub-
lic is not exclusively reserved to holders of top leadership positions, even 
though the opportunity tobe politically influential increases with seniority of 
position. They confirm that positional power and political influence have tobe 
considered as distinct phenomena. 
4. Elite Integration in the Federal Republic or Germany 
The sociometric links among position-holders and their links to persons out-
side the original positional sample can also be used to study the network of 
interactions at the apex of West Germany society. Tue existence of such a 
network, in which the various sectors of society are represented, indicates that 
all sectors participate in national political decision-making. lt is therefore a 
crucial indicator of elite integration. In analyzing this network, we followed 
closely the approach taken by Moore and Higley in their analyses of American 
and Australian elites (Moore 1979, Higley et al. 1979, Higley and Moore 1981 ). 
This rests on theoretical considerations suggested by Kadushin (1968) and a 
method developed by Alba (1973). The nominations of interaction partners 
are treated as links connecting elite members (respondents as well as non-
respondents). Tue total network of these links is input to a network analysis 
that searches for regions of higher density, i.e. for cliques of face-to-face 
groups (maximal complete subgraphs) and social circles which are defined as 
highly overlapping cliques. 
Tbc validity of this approach for studying power structure has been ques-
tioned, mainly for three reasons: for using a relational as compared to a 
structural model of network analysis, for interpreting network centrality as an 
indicator of power, and for treating links symmetrically. Because of their 
theoretical importance, the implications of each of these decisions have to be 
discussed in some detail. 
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4.1. The analysis procedure4 
Input to the analysis programme~ is the matrix of links between persons. 
Nominations are treated as binary and symmetric, i.e. as existent or non-
existent, and as reciprocal. The input data include all persons who: 
- are themselves respondents and are linked to at least two other persons, 
either because they have nominated interaction partners or have received 
nominations; 
- are not respondents but have received at least two nominations and can 
therefore serve as a link between two respondents. 6 
The network analysis provides thus a "correction" of the positional method by 
including people who are political influentials without formally holding an 
elite position. On the other band, those with less than two links to others are 
treated as isolates and omitted from further analysis, even if they belong to the 
original sample. 
Within the network of links among persons, the analysis procedure first 
searches for maximally complete subgraphs, i.e., cliques of face-to-face 
groups. In a second step, cliques that differ by not more than one member are 
aggregated to social circles. In a third step, finally, circles that overlap to a 
specified degree are further aggregated. The overlap criterion used in our 
analysis as well as in the two previous studies of U .S. and Australian elites was 
two-thirds. 
The final result of the analysis are social circles made up of overlapping 
cliques, as well as cliques that could not be aggregated to circles because they 
were relatively isolated and did not satisfy the overlap criterion. A typical 
result of the procedure when applied to elite data is the emergence of one 
relatively !arge circle. lts size as weil as its rnulti-sectoral composition dis-
tinguish this circle from the other groups in the network. In her analysis of the 
American elite network, Moore has called it the "central circle". 
Pappi has argued that the central circle is a result of the approach taken, 
because "the merging of links, irrespective of discussion topics, into one large 
network wipes away all issue-specific contours and identifies a core region of 
persons active in several issue areas. This is of no disadvantage for the 
procedure, because mediating between different issue publics is one of the 
principal functions of the integrative core of an elite system". (Pappi 1984: 85). 
The emergence of a central circle has tobe considered as a substantive analysis 
result rather than being merely a methodological artifact. The central circle 
constitutes an overarching influence network linking people active in different 
issue areas. lts existence shows that decision-making on national issues is not 
disjointed, but that these decision-making processes are connected through 
overlapping sets of participants. The network data used for the analysis even 
underestimate the actual density of the network since they are based on 
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nominations made for one issue per person only, while we can assume that in 
fact each elite member is involved in several issues at the same time. 
4.2. Relational vs. structural models of network analysis 
Network analysis offers two basic types of rnodels, relational models and 
structural models. While relational models look for regions of higher density 
(cohesion) in the overall network, structural rnodels divide the members of a 
network into subsets of structurally equivalent positions, i.e. blocks of persons 
with similar relations to other5 (cf. Burt 1978). 
Kadushin's concept of social circles is a relational model, based on direct as 
weil as indirect links among circle mernbers. Social circles display three basic 
characteristics: they are informal, interstitial, and invisible (Kadushin 1979: 
129f.). This implies also that they are open-ended and have no formal hierarch-
ical structure (Kadushin 1968: 692f.). The concept also assumes that the 
integration of the members of a social circle is mainly brought about by indirect 
relations. According to Kadushin (1968) and (Granovetter 1982: 122) indirect 
ties are important means to facilitate communication within a larger network. 
The concept of social circles is particularly suited for studying national elites in 
complex societies. The !arge number of issues that have to be settled by 
political decision-making requires a differentiated, flexible. and open-ended7, 
yet sufficiently weil integrated, elite. While the existence of elite integration as 
such does not necessarily guarantee a high degree of coordination between 
different decisions8 , it nevertheless facilitates the information flow between 
different decision-making arenas and provides therefore a crucial precondi-
tion for coordination. 
In his discussion of the relative merits ofrelational as cornpared to structural 
models, Burt has argued that only the latter are capable of distinguishing 
between different types of actors. In bis view, they can detect cohesive sub-
groups in a !arger network, but also "sycophants" and "brokers" which tend to 
be ignored by relational models. "Sycophants" are persons who narne presti· 
gious others but whose choices are not reciprocated while "brokers" link 
different subgroups within the !arger network. Both are characterized by 
having no direct relations to actors in the same position, but similar relations to 
those in other positions (Burt 1978: 197). 
However, Burt's conclusion that subgroups based on cohesion are just a 
subset of subgroups based on structural equivalence (1978: 198) is incorrect. In 
fact, structural models do not systematically search for cohesive subgroups 
(Moore 1979:680, Alba 1982: 66). lnstead, both models measure different 
features of a network, and the choice between them depends entirely on the 
theoretical problem at stake. For studying elite integration, relational models 
seem more appropriate. They allow the researcher to determine the degree of 
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overall integration of an elite as weil as tlle existence of a core elite defined as 
the denser part of the overall elite network. However, to what extent is Burt' 
argument correct that relational models are incapable of detecting different 
types of structural positions such as brokers and sycrophants? With respect to 
the broker position, his conclusion seems unwarranted. In a model emphasiz-
ing the importance of weak ties, brokers perform an important rote in connect-
ing different subgroups of the network. They can therefore be easily detected 
by looking for those persons in a clique or circle who have more outgroup 
relations. 
Unfortunately, Burt is correct with respect to the inability of relational 
models to detect sycophants. These models are vulnerable insofar as un-
important persons can artificially increase their network centrality by name-
dropping. To minimize this effect, it is therefore advisable to include in the 
analysis only the nominations of those respondents who themselves satisfy a 
criterion of network centrality, e.g. have received a minimal number of 
nominations. 
4.3. Network centrality as a measure of political influence 
Many authors have argued that power lies in the ability to realize one's 
interests and is therefore analytically distinct from centrality in a communi-
cation network (e.g. Cook 1982: 185ff.).lnstead, they have preferred to con-
ceptualize power in terms of interest, control, and dependency. In this vein, 
'Pappi (1984: 9lff.) found that centrality in a communication network and the 
number of nominations for power reputation were only moderately associated 
in the local elite he was studying. While power reputation was concentrated 
among a small number of individuals, the communication network was much 
!arger. He concluded therefore that the existence of an inclusive elite circle 
based on interaction nominations does not preclude the simultaneous exist-
ence of a power elite. Pappi's argument for the existence of a power elite is 
problematic, however, since it is exclusively based on power reputation. The 
power elite he has detected proves only that the respondents i.e. the members 
of the local elite he studied, shared a perception of whom they considered tobe 
powerful in their community. This confirms previous empirical studies that 
have consistently shown that the reputational method tends to find a power 
elite while the decisional method usually results in a more pluralist structure 
(cf. Putnam 1976: 78, Moore undated: 18). 
Finding a power elite based on reputational nominations reflects therefore 
primarily the social psychological regularity that power perceptions tend to be 
skewed in the direction of a high degree of power centralization. This cannot, 
however, be considered as a stringent argument against the validity of network 
centrality as a measure of political influence. lt confirms at best that power and 
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influence are two distinct though related concepts. There exists no a priori 
criterion to decide which of the two is a more adequate tool for determining 
who has an impact on political decisions in a social system. 
One obvious way to settle this question empirically is to look at the decision-
making output of a system and see whether this reflects the preferences of a 
power elite whose members were defined by power reputation or rather those 
of a more inclusive elite circle of political influentials. However, in their local 
elite study, Pappi and Kappelhoff did not find significant attitudinal differ-
ences between these two groups. A power elite is thus not necessarily charac-
terized by different preferences or a greater attitudinal homogeneity, as power 
elite theorists have often assumed: "The outstanding characteristic of the 
power elite in this system is solely its power and not the uniformity of its 
interests" (Pappi and Kappelhoff 1984: 105). That means that it may be 
impossible to determine empirically whose preferences were ultimately re-
sponsible for a decision. 
One theoretical argument against the claim that power reputation is superi-
or as a measure of political influence to participation in a communication 
network of political decision-makers, lies in its one-dimensional conceptual-
ization of power. lt assumes the existence of a single power hierarchy. The 
previous discussion of the positional approach has shown that power in a 
differentiated society rests on various resources that are not amenable to a 
simple rank order. Accordingly, the model of elite circles conceptualizes 
political influence as access to a decision-making arena. Since this access is not 
open to everyone, the model is not oblivious to the hierarchical aspect of 
power. ln fact, it is not inoonsistent with the assumption that positional power 
resources play a crucial role in political decision-making. lt takes into account, 
however, that among the participants in political decision-making, there exists 
no simple hierarchical relationship. lnstead, it assumes that decisions are 
reached by communication and bargaining rather than authoritative decision· 
making. 
4.4. Symmetrie vs. asymmetric treatment of links 
The decision to treat links symmetrically discounts the fact that it may make a 
difference if a person is the initiator or rather the addressee of an interaction. 
In bis analysis, Pappi expected that peripheral members would be more often 
initiators while the members of the integrative core, i.e. the incumbents of 
positions of (political) authority, would be the main addressees of communi-
cation. The reasoning behind this was that "peripheral members have interests 
which they try to realize through oontacts with the integrative core" (Pappi 
1984: 85). The data did not corroborate this assumption, however. Instead, the 
integrative core was the main target as weil as the major source of influence 
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attempts (Pappi 1984: 87). The status of initiator or addressee of communi-
cation is obviously not systematically related to political influence. 
Our data require a symmetric interpretation of links for pragmatic as weil as 
theoretical reasons. First, tbis allows the inclusion of non-respondents into the 
analysis. These may be holders of elite positions who refused tobe interviewed 
as weil as persons who bave been named as important interaction partners 
without holding an elite position. Furtbennore, the very method by which 
nominations were elicited during tbe interviews enforces a symmetric treat· 
ment of tbe nominations. One has to recall that respondents made nomi· 
nations only for the one issue on wbicb tbey bad been most active during the 
last year. Since one can presume that elite persons are normally simultaneous· 
ly active on more tban one issue, they often received nominations in more than 
one issue context. Thus, while tbe nominations made by respondents were 
restricted to one sphere of activity, the received nominations show how several 
spheres of activity were linked by involving the same individuals. There is no a 
priori reason to assume that tbese nominations would not have been reciproc-
ated if issue-specific questions bad been used. 
4.5. The West German elite network9 
The West Gennan elite network was analyzed by using the procedure described 
above. lt was decided, however, to utilize only the nominations of those respon· 
dents wbo bad themselves received at least one nomination. This was done partly 
because the German sample was rather !arge and tbe matrix of nominations for 
the entire sample could have posed tecbnieal problems of data processing, but 
also out of theoretical reasons. Given the possibility tbat respondents could bave 
artificially increased their own centrality in the network by name-dropping (cf. 
Higley et al. 1979: 259, Pappi 1984: 93), this criterion ensured that a respondent 
bad been named as important in at least one issue context. The probability of 
respondents to be included in the network was thus lowered and made more 
comparable to that of non-respondents who needed at least two nominations. 10 
Table 1 shows that 1,358 members of the positional elite in our study fulfilled this 
criterion, 71!lJ of whom were also respondents. 
After eliminating isolates, the network analyzed included 1,230 persons, 
79.6% of whom were sample members (not necessarily respondents)11: 20.4% 
were additional interaction partners (cf. Table 5). This network bad a density 
of 0.005, i.e. 0.5% of all possible links between individuals in the network 
were in fact present. The analysis revealed 1,253 cliques, i.e. maximal com-
plete subgraphs. This number was reduced to 43 by aggregating highly over-
lapping cliques to circles. As in the previous analyses of American and Austra-
lian elites, nearly all of these were rather small, with the exception of one !arge 
central circle of 559 persons. Tue density of the central circle was higber than 
that of the network at !arge, with 1. 7% of all possible links actually present. 
Ta!>le 5. Mcmbcrship in samplc, network, and ccntral circle. 
Total x• Samplc mcmbcrs x Other peoons x Mcmbers of top samplc x 
n % n %' % n %' % n %' % 
Total pcrsons 
registered 6568 100.0 1.7 3164 48.2 100.0 2.2 3404 51.8 100.0 1.3 904 13.8 100.0 5.1 
Not in network 5338 81.3 0.8 2185 40.9 69.l 0.3 3153 59.l 92.6 1.1 413 7.7 45.7 0.4 
Network 1230 18.7 6.0 919 79.6 30.9 6.7 251 20.4 7.4 3.1 491 39.3 54.3 10.2 
Central circle 559 8.5 9.0 495 88.6 15.6 9.7 64 11.4 1.9 3.9 296 53.0 32.7 13.7 
1 Average number of nominations reccived; 2 Row pcrccntagcs. 
$ 
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Compared to the U.S. and Australian central circles, the West German one is 
at the same time !arger and less dense. This is primarily due to the !arger size of 
the initial network. A previous analysis of a subset of the West German 
network - comparable in its size to those studied in the other two countries -
had instead revealed a central circle closely similar in size and density to those 
found in America and Australia. This can be seen in Table 6 (cf. also Hoff-
mann-Lange and Wolf 1984). Since the analysis of the smaller network was 
based on the nominations made by members of the top sample only, we can 
interpret the differences between the two analyses of West German elite 
networks as indicating that elite integration is higher among the holdel'li of top 
positions tban among a broader, more inclusive eJite Stratum. This interpreta-
tion is also supported by the distribution of nominations: incumbents of top 
positions not only received more nominations, they also nominated one an-
other more frequently: 53.3% of the nominations of members of the top 
sample as compared to 45.3% of all nominations went to top sample members. 
The same effect can be seen in Table 5. Members of the top sample, while 
accounting for only 13.8% of all persons registered as either position-holders 
or interaction partners, have a share of 39.3% in the network and even of 
53.0% in the central circle. Network centrality is strongly related to seniority 
of position. 
4. 6. The sector composition of the central circle 
The incompleteness of the matrix 12 requires a cautious interpretation of the 
Table 6. The US, Australian and West Gcrman elite networks. 
USA' Australia1 West- West-
Germany I' Germany II 
Sample: 
n 545 370 492' 780' 
Network: 
n 876 746 799 1230 
Densityin% 0.7 l.1 0.9 0.5 
Cliqucs (maximal 
completc subgraphs) 442 1132 739 1253 
Aggregated subgraphs 32 II 22 43 
Central circle: 
n 227 418 340 559 
Dcnsityin% 3.8 2.6 2.7 1.7 
1 Figuresreported in Moore 1979: 680f.; Higleyetal. 1979: 241ff.; Moore etal. 1980: 19f; 1Figures 
rcported in Hoffmann-Lange/Wolf 1984: 49f; 3 469 interviewed holders or top positions plus 23 
othcr rcspondents who had rcceived at least 3 nominations by top respondcnts; 'All rcspondcnts 
who had received at least one nomination. 
Tab/e 7. Seetor composition of sample. network, and central circle. 
Seetor Sample Other Nctwork Sample Other Central Sample Other persons 
persons~ members persons circle members in in central 
in network in network central circle circle 
--
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Politics SPD 199 6.3 221 6.5 172 14.0 143 14.6 29 11.6 90 16.1 83 16.8 7 10.9 
CDU/CSU 208 6.6 216 6.3 168 13.7 137 14.0 31 12.4 84 15.0 73 14.7 II 17.2 
FDP 45 1.4 61 1.8 59 4.8 43 4.4 16 6.4 34 6.1 29 5.9 5 7.8 
Politics total' 452 14.3 535 15.7 403 32.8 323 33.0 80 31.9 209 37.4 185 37.4 24 37.5 
Civil service 471 14.9 518 15.2 209 17.0 173 17.7 36 14.3 76 13.6 68 13.7 8 12.5 
Business 688 21.7 353 10.4 138 11.2 126 12.9 12 4.8 66 11.8 64 12.9 2 3.1 
Business 
associations 295 9.3 251 7.4 98 8.0 78 8.0 20 8.0 41 7.3 38 7.7 3 4.7 
Trade unions 155 4.9 127 3.7 88 7.2 69 7.0 19 7.6 44 7.9 38 7.7 6 9.4 
Massmedia 354 11.2 421 12.4 107 8.7 80 8.2 27 10.8 46 8.2 39 7.9 7 10.9 
Academic 179 5.7 410 12.0 96 7.8 64 6.5 32 12.7 46 8.2 37 7.5 9 14.1 
Military 172 5.4 12 0.4 6 0.5 5 0.5 1 0.4 1 0.2 1 0.2 0 0.0 
Culturc 180 5.7 88 2.6 12 1.0 11 1.1 1 0.4 3 0.5 3 0.6 0 0.0 
Other' 218 6.9 689 20.2 73 5.9 50 5.1 23 9.2 27 4.8 22 4.4 s 7.8 
To10/ 3164 100.0 3404 100.0 1230 100.1 979 100.0 251 100.1 559 99.9 495 100.0 64 100.0 
1 lncluding non-sample politicians with othcr party affiliation or whose party affiliation could not he ascertained; 2 lncluding foreigners nominated; 'Among 
these were 167 ( 4.9%) foreigners who werc assigned to the "Other" category. There were also 37(1.1 % ) politicians of other parties (mainly thc Greens) or 
whose party could not he asccrtaincd. These werc assigned 10 the sector "Politics total". 
;:::! 
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results with respect to the individuals in the central circle. At the same time, we 
can be much more confident as far as the sector composition of the central 
circle is concerned: first, the sector composition of the respondents on whose 
nominations the network analysis was based did not differ systematically from 
that of the original sample of position-holders; and secondly, a considerable 
proportion of the nominations were intersectoral rather than intrasectoral 
(77.7%). The latter ensures that intersectorally important persons are in-
cluded in the network regardless of the sector composition of the respondents 
whose nominations were used for analysis. A comparison of the sector compo-
sition of the central circle with that of the original positional sample reveals to 
what degree representatives of the different sectors are integrated in anational 
decision-making network (Table 7). The major result is the increased impor-
tance of the political sector which accounts for nearly 40% of all central circle 
members. More than half of the circle's membership is made up of political-
administrative personnel. This dominance is easily explained by the fact that 
these sectors are by definition involved in political decision-making. To a 
certain extent this is also true for business associations and trade unions. These 
pressure groups are, with around eight percent each, nearly equally repre-
sented in the central circle. The higher degree of organizational centralization 
of the trade unions, which was responsible for their smaller share in the 
positional elite sample, is thus compensated by a higher representation ratio of 
their leaders in the central circle. 
The shares of business corporations and the mass media are smaller in the 
central circle than in the positional sample. They are nevertheles higher than a 
textbook interpretation of the roles of these sectors would presume. The same 
is true for the academic sector whose representation in the central circle is even 
higher than in the sample. The military and the cultural sectors, finally, are the 
only sample groups not integrated in the decision-making core of the West 
German elite. 
The sector compositions of the West German, American, and Australian 
central circles are strikingly similar. In all three countries, about half of the 
circle members belang to the political-administrative sectors. The relation 
between the political and the civil service components differ, however, accord-
ing to the different role the permanent civil service plays in these countries. In 
the United States, most positions in the political executive are occupied by 
political appointees. Hence, only 5. 7% of the central circle members are civil 
servants. The proportion of civil servants is instead 13.6% in West Germany 
and even 18.4% in Australia (Higley and Moore 1981: 591). 
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5. Conclusion 
The analysis of the sociometric nominations of West German elite respondents 
has shown to what extent positional resources are transformed into political 
influence. In contrast to positional power, membership in a network of in-
formal influence relations indicates that a person participates in the decision-
making on political issues. In West Germany, this network includes members 
of all major sectors except for military and cultural elites. Political, civil 
service, and business elites figure most prominently in the network. Leaders of 
business corporations, mass media, and academic elites are in fact much more 
involved than one would expect, given their role definitions which give them 
important social power resources but not much formal competence in political 
decision-making. 
Given the ever-present desire to know who the powerful in a country are, 
one is tempted to consider the members of the central circle as the West 
German "power elite". This is partly justified since it includes the persons who 
formed the central core of political decision-makers during the time of the elite 
survey. Some qualifications have tobe made, however. The central circle is 
not invariant over time. lts membership changes with the ever-changing 
political agenda. Moreover, since most circle members are incumbents of 
formal leadership positions, their membership depends primarily on their 
being representatives of organizations rather than on their personal qualities. 
lt is very likely that most of them will be replaced by their successors as soon as 
they move out of their positions. One can therefore assume that the central 
circle in West Germany today is made up of different individuals than the one 
we found in 1981. 
Secondly, the criterion used to determine the boundaries of the central 
circle is not the only conceivable one. Other, equally plausible criteria could be 
used which would lead to smaller or !arger central circles. Furthermore, circle 
membership was determined by using data on activity in political decision-
making. lt is therefore limited to participants in political decision-making and 
does not include persons with only indirect influence on political decisions. 
Last but not least, the incompleteness of the interview data can be assumed to 
have bad some impact on the results. 
These reservations do not invalidate the approach but require some caution 
concerning the interpretation of the results. This is particularly crucial with 
respect to the individual circle members even though confidence in the sector 
composition of the circle is justified. 
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Notes 
1. The study was carricd out by a research team at the University of Mannheim. Principal 
investigators were Rudolf Wildenmann. Max Kaase. and the author. lt was supported by a 
grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. GETAS, Bremen, did the major part of the 
field work. ZUMA. Mannheim, provided help in the preliminary stage of questionnaire 
construction as weil as in the preparation of the data-sets. 
A machine-readable codebook of the sutvey data was produced by the Zentralarchiv, 
Cologne (ZA No. 1139): Rudolf Wildenmann, Max Kaase, Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Al-
brecht Kutteroff, Gunter Wolf, Führungsschicht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1981. 
Mannheim: Universität Mannheim 1982. 
2. Fora similar argumentation sec also Moore (1977: 46ff.). 
3. For interpreting the nominations for sample members in the academic and cultural scctors, a 
note of caution scems warranted. The positional approach implies that thcsc sectors are 
represented by persons other than readers might expect. The academic elite in the study is not 
made up of distinguished scholars, nor is the cultural scctor reprcscnted by well-known 
authors, movie directors, or painters. Instead, the academicscctorincludes the administrative 
heads of universities, rescarch institutions and academic associations. In the cultural sector, 
the persons in charge of cullure and cntertainment in the media were sclected. Thus, not the 
producers of knowledge and art. but rather lhe administrators of lhcsc two scctors belong to 
the positionally defined elite sample. 
4. The following description is bascd on Alba (1973), Moore (1979), and Higley et al. (1979). 
5. The program COMPLT developed by Richard Alba was used for performing the network 
analysis. 
6. These non-respondents included members of the positionally defined elite sample who could 
not bc intctviewed as well as additional persons who were not sample members. 
7. This is not to deny that thc assumption of a closed elite system may be appropriate for elites of 
less differentiated social systems, as for instance for the middle-sized community studied by 
Pappi and bis associates. Cf. Pappi and Kappelhoff (1984: 100, 115). 
8. Marsden (1982: 206) has argued that indirect transfers of resources "occur on an entirely 
idiosyncratic basis. They takc place only becanse two dyadic exchanges happen to have one 
party in common. The indirect exchanges are not bascd on the relative interests of the 
periphcral actors in one an9ther, but instead on the relative intcrests govcrning thcir dyadic 
transactions with the intennediary". 
9. Thc nctwork analysis was carried out by Gunter Wolf, to whom 1 am greatly indebted, not 
only for sharing thc results, but also for many discussions from which 1 have leamcd a great 
deal about thc thcory and methods of network analysis. 
10. The same criterion has been uscd by Pappi and Melbeck (1984: 564) who have argued that 
only those members of the positional elile can be considered as a member of an elite system 
who were designated as influential by at least one other elite member. 
11. One has always to bear in mind tbat the distinction made here is not betwcen respondents and 
non-respondents, but between sample members and additional interaction partners. 
12. The matrix is incomplete because it does not indude links among non-respondents (cf. Higley 
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et al. 1979: 259, Pappi 1984: 84). This is the inevitable consequcnce of using interview data 
which always have a less than perfect response rate, but also of the open-endedncss of thc 
procedurc that calls for the inclusion of non-respondents. lts main effect is tbat respondents 
bave an artificially increased chance to belong to the denser part of the network. We tried to 
countcract Ibis effect by requiring respondents to have rcceived at least one nomination. 
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